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Three Major Issues Concerning Randomised Social 
Experimentation in France
*
Bernard Gomel**, Évelyne Serverin***
In the 1960s, tools were developed in France to test laws before they were 
adopted. This form of assessment eventually acquired a constitutional basis 
with the Act of 28 March 2003 authorising normative experimentation, both 
nationally and locally. This innovation was the key to a specific form of 
experimentation, namely the randomised experiment. It borrows its method-
ology from social sciences, and its perimeter from international policies on 
poverty. This form of experimentation raises three issues, which are discussed 
in three successive sections. The first one is a matter of legal science: what 
role does this form of experimentation play within the scope of normative 
experiments? The second question is a scientific one: what lessons does social 
experimentation bring to experimental science, applied to human behaviour? 
The third issue is socio-political: what is its contribution to the evaluation of 
public policies? The conclusion recalls the ethical and scientific requirements 
that are necessary in the conduct and evaluation of experiments on human 
behaviour.
In a democratic system citizens may demand accountability for the use of public finances via their representatives. This process involves enacting rules, evaluating 
their scope, and resorting to an argumentative apparatus in which statistical data occupy 
a central place. Figures are used ex ante to provide reasons to legislate, by identifying 
situations whose evolution calls for changes to applicable rules. Figures are also used 
as the basis of predictions about the effects of new rules on a particular situation. Ex 
post, statistical evaluations aim to measure the impact of rules, defined according to 
their use, and to assess their effectiveness, which is judged in terms of the ability of a 
rule to meet stated objectives. Ex ante assessments involve prior studies. These may 
concern the rationalisation of budget choices (LÉVY-LAMBERT, GUILLAUME, 1971), 
* Translation: Nicholas Sowels. 
Article published in French in Travail et Emploi, n° 135, juillet-septembre 2013.
** Centre d’études de l’emploi (Centre for Employment Studies – CEE) ; bernard.gomel@cee-recherche.fr
*** Centre de théorie et analyses du droit (CTAD); eserveri@u-paris10.fr
sqdqsdqd
Bernard Gomel, Évelyne Serverin
86  – Travail et Emploi – 2015 Special Edition
impact studies which have been made mandatory under the French Constitution since 
2009, in the passing of parliamentary Bills.1 Ex post evaluations concern the vast field 
of public policy assessment (VIVERET, 1990), which is officially vested in the French 
Parliament under Article 24 of the Constitution.2 Evaluation techniques have developed 
above all in the “preparation” of norms and standards, appearing as of the 1960s, 
with laws and rules that are very explicitly presented as “experimental”. Such evalu-
ation was given a constitutional basis in Law No 2003-276 of 28 March 2003, which 
concerns the devolved organization of the French Republic, and which authorises 
normative experimentation both nationally and locally. This innovation opened the 
door to another type of experimentation, namely random experimentation, which draws 
on social science methodologies, and which is also applied to international policies on 
poverty (ALLÈGRE, 2008; GOMEL, SERVERIN, 2009).
It is now a little more than five years since random social experimentation has been 
used in France, within the perimeter of social policy reform. It is therefore legitimate 
to review the meaning and scope of this kind of experimentation. To this end, three 
questions may be raised:
1/  In terms of legal science, what is the role of this form of experimentation in the 
perimeter of normative experimentation?
2/  From a scientific point of view, what are the lessons of this experimentation for 
social experimentation applied to human behaviour?
3/  From a socio-political perspective, what has the contribution of experimentation 
been to the implementation of reforms?
Lastly, this article will examine the ethical and scientific demands which are 
inherent in all forms of experimentation relating to human behaviour.
The Place of Random Experimentation 
in Normative Experimentation
If we look at the chronology of experimentation in public policy in France, it can 
be seen that the Administration (government) preceded researchers in being concerned 
about anticipating the effects of reforms. Making such practices constitutional has 
opened the way to normative experimentation at the national and local level. Random 
social experimentation has emerged locally where social policies actually develop.
1. Article 39 of the French Constitution. The Organic law (or enabling Act) No 2009-403 of 15 April 2009 relating 
to the application of articles 34-1, 39 and 44 of the Constitution.
2. “Parliament votes the laws. It controls the actions of the Government. It evaluates public policies.”
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Experimentation As a Way of Anticipating the Effects of Norms and Standards
Testing laws begins with the idea that political decisions strive for positive effects 
through reform, but are also concerned about negative effects. From this point of view, 
administrative experimentation already has a long history.
The term “experimentation” was not used in France’s laws on abortion (Interruption 
volontaire de grossesse – IVG) and Minimum Income Support (Revenu minimum 
d’insertion – RMI), but they were in fact the first examples to use testing.3 The IVG 
Law on abortion suspended criminal law for a period of five years, while the RMI 
Law provided minimum income support for three years.4 Once these terms ended, the 
respective governments introduced new Bills to perpetuate the laws.
Testing laws also arose in waivers and derogations to the rules of ordinary law 
affecting people in the same situation, and which therefore bypassed the principle of 
equality before the law.
Successive interventions by France’s Constitutional Court on such measures have 
recognised their experimental nature as a justification for breaching the principle of 
equality. In a ruling pronounced on 28 July 1993, the Court specified that:
“It is even open to Parliament to provide for the possibility of conducting experiments 
that involve derogations to the rules defined above, to allow it subsequently to adopt 
new rules, in the wake of results, which are appropriate to changes in the missions 
of the establishments in question. However, lawmakers have to define precisely the 
nature and scope of the experiments, the situations in which they may be conducted, 
the conditions and procedures according to which they are evaluated that may lead 
them to be maintained, modified, generalised or dropped.”
A second ruling on 6 November 1996 concerned the information and consultation 
of employees in certain companies. It reiterated these demands in situations in which 
social partners obtained derogations to ordinary law on collective bargaining agree-
ments, due to the experimental nature of a measure, provided that the Government 
reported on experiments to Parliament within five years.5
These legislative practices have been supplemented by executive measures, 
involving the enactment of standards that are limited in time and space.
Thus, the principle of equality before the law was not deemed to have been 
breached in the case of the progressive application of health controls in food com-
panies, due to a lack of veterinarians.6 Similarly, a decree in 1968 creating a new judge 
only in certain courts or courts of appeal was not considered as violating the principle 
3. Law No 75–17 of 17 January 1975 introduced abortion (IVG), and Law No 88-1088 of 1 December 1988 introduced 
Minimum Income Support (RMI).
4. Until 1979 for the IVG Law (Art. 2), and until 30 June 1992 for the RMI Law (Art. 52).
5. Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutionnal Council), decision 6 November 1996, No 96-383 DC.
6. Conseil d’État (Council of State), Section, 13 October 1967, No 64778, Rec. CE., p. 365; Revue de droit public, 
1968, p. 408.
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of equality before the law in so far as such limitations were provisional.7 Lastly, an 
opinion given by France’s Council of State on 24 June 1993 accepted different tariff 
measures applied to users of railway lines by the SNCF (the French railway company). 
Even though the users had similar characteristics, tariff differences were accepted 
because they were limited to an experiment lasting one year, which was to lead to the 
definition of criteria used in a new tariff regime.8
The validity of legal measures and regulations therefore depends on the existence 
of an assessment being undertaken by an authority which is enacting standards and 
the assessment must be followed up by a report.
The Constitutional Acceptance of Normative Experimentation
After 40 years of testing legislation of all types, it was no longer possible to 
continue with such methods without giving them a constitutional foundation. In its 
ruling of 17 January 2002, the Constitutional Council considered 
“that by opening to Parliament, albeit experimentally and based on a derogation 
limited in time, the possibility of authorising local government in Corsica to take 
measures falling within the field of the law, the law in question actually intervenes 
in areas which belong to the jurisdiction of the Constitution”.9
Following this decision, Constitutional Law No 2003-246 of 28 March 2003, 
relating to the devolved organization of the Republic (known to some as “Act II 
of France’s devolution”: JANIN, 2005), authorised normative experimentation both 
nationally and locally. On the one hand, it introduced Article 37-1 into the Constitution 
which states that: “laws and regulations may include measures of an experimental 
nature which are limited in time”. On the other hand, it added to Article 72 of the 
Constitution, which relates to local government, a fourth paragraph allowing local 
authorities the possibility to “derogate from legislative and regulatory measures which 
govern the exercise of their competencies, on an experimental basis for limited pur-
poses and duration”. Applying this latter measure, the Organic Law No 2003-704 of 
1 August 2003 of the General Code of Local Government added a chapter specifically 
dedicated to experiments, for which the Organic Law provides a general framework. 10
7. Conseil d’État, 21 February 1968, No 68615 et seq., Ordre des avocats près la cour d’appel de Paris, Rec. CE., 
p. 123; Dalloz, 1968, p. 222.
8. Conseil d’État, Assemblée générale, section TP, 24 June 1993, avis No 353605.
9. Conseil constitutionnel, 17 January 2002, No 2001-454, statut de la Corse, note J.-E. Schoettl : L’actualité 
juridique : droit administratif, 2002, p. 100 et seq.
10. “On the basis of the fourth paragraph of Article 72 of the Constitution, the law authorises local governments to 
derogate from the legislation governing the exercise of their powers, on an experimental basis. The law defines the 
purpose of such experimentation and its duration, which may not exceed five years, and lists the provisions which 
may be waived. The law also specifies the legal nature and characteristics of the local authorities which are allowed 
to participate in testing and, if necessary, the cases in which experimentation can be undertaken. It sets the time limit 
within which local authorities, meeting the conditions it has laid down, may apply to participate in the experiment” 
(Article LO 1113-1).
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Observers have noted that including experimentation in the Constitution has led 
neither to much controversy nor to debate (STAHL, 2010). This relative silence suggests 
there is a kind of consensus on the fact that, following 40 years of practice, there is 
an interest in testing norms and standards before generalising them. Yet by setting out 
the virtues of “normative prudence”, constitutional texts have now opened the door to 
experimental methods which have never been discussed before.
The Uses of Constitutional Authorisation
Since the revision of the Constitution came into force in 2003, article 37-1 has 
been invoked most, mainly in administrative (i.e. governmental) reasoning. Social 
experimentation for its part is based on Article 72.
Following the tradition of texts relating to testing, experimentation under 
article 37-1 has been largely geared to administrative action, from a technical and 
budgetary point of view.
The first use of constitutional authorisation occurred with the Law of 13 August 
2004 concerning “local liberties and responsibilities” (JANIN, 2005). This Law expanded 
the field of experimentation with respect to the transfer and delegation of responsi-
bilities and competencies, be they for the management of financing or the exercise of 
competencies. When it examined an appeal against this text, the Constitutional Council 
drew on this new foundation to reaffirm the criteria for experimentation which had 
been forged in previous decisions.11
In another decision of 13 December 2007, the Constitutional Council states that 
“article 37-1 of the Constitution provides that the Social Security Financing Law 
includes experimental provisions […], but that the Council would have to censor 
provisions that […] are actually not about experimental application, but applications 
limited in time”.12 
This position expresses an essential idea, namely that experimental measures can only 
function if they are accompanied by an evaluation that looks at all the consequences 
of the reform.
Other reforms pursuing economic or social or environmental purposes are 
expensive and so need to go through an experimental “airlock”. There are many exam-
ples.13 The latest example concerns the development of citizen assessors in criminal 
11. Conseil constitutionnel, 12 August 2004, No 2004-503 DC: “article 37-1 of the Constitution, which follows the 
constitutional revision of 28 March 2003 referred to above, allows Parliament to authorise experiments which derogate 
from the principle of equality before the law, for limited purposes and duration, in view of their possible generalisation. 
[…] However, lawmakers must define the objectives and the conditions [of such experimentation] with sufficient 
precision and not disregard other requirements of constitutional value”.
12. Conseil constitutionnel, 13 December 2007, No 2007-558 DC – the Law financing public health insurance.
13. Sections 37-1 and 38 of the Constitution were covered by Ordinance No 2006-433 of 13 April 2006, “experi-
menting the contract on the professional transition contract” for identified employment areas (a measure repealed 
by Law No 2011-893 of 28 July 2011 for the development of training in sandwich courses and providing career 
security). Under the same heading, Law No 2008-596 of June 25, 2008 on the modernisation of the labour market, 
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cases, by Law No 2011-939 of 10 August 2011. This resulted in a (negative) report 
issued by two judges of France’s Supreme court (Cour de cassation) (SALVAT, BOCCON-
GIBOD, 2013).
In all these areas, experimentation concerns norms and standards themselves, 
and its inclusion in all norms affecting social, economic, and budgetary policies. The 
task of experimentation falls on the Administration itself, without recourse to external 
research. Above all, no scientific hypotheses are tested. Thus, for example, it was not 
planned in the experiment on citizen assessors to test the “severity” of non-magistrates, 
even though this had been one of the reasons for the reform. Only the consequences of 
the measure were to be assessed. In short, experimentation amounts to a sort of “peni-
tence clause” to avoid undertaking future measures that are expensive, controversial, 
or which present serious risks of being distorted.
Random experimentation does not have its roots in article 37-1, but in Article 72 
of the Constitution. For the first time, the objective of the experiment was not to check 
the quality of a norm, the feasibility of reform or even its cost. Instead, experimentation 
was to measure the effects on the behaviour of the persons subject to the experiment.
Social experimentation with random assignment has a long international history. 
But it began in France with the report of the Families, Vulnerability and Poverty 
Committee (Commission Familles, vulnérabilité, pauvreté, 2005), chaired by Martin 
Hirsch. It suggested the government use “experimentation programmes that it [the 
government] would define itself but would like to test on part of the national territory” 
(GOMEL, SERVERIN, 2009, 2011). Lawmakers took up this advice in two stages. First 
with Article 142 of the Finance Law for 2007 of 21 December 2006:
“On an experimental basis, to improve the conditions of financial incentives for 
persons returning to work and to simplify access to assisted employment contracts, 
the Departments [i.e. French counties] mentioned by the decree provided for in 
Article LO 1113-2 of the General Code on Local Authorities are authorised to adopt 
all of the exceptions to the provisions of the Labour Code and Code for Social Action 
and Families in favour of the beneficiaries of minimum income, for a period of three 
years from the date of publication of the decree […]”
On 4 May 2007, two Departments (Eure and Côte d’Or), which had previously 
declared themselves as volunteers on 1 February and 23 March 2007, were authorised 
by decree to conduct experiments. These related firstly to improving the conditions 
of financial incentives to return to employment; and secondly to simplifying access 
to subsidised work contracts. On 20 June 2007, the General Council of Eure adopted 
a resolution setting out the derogation rules for experimentation in the Department. 
introduced a new employment contract related to the defined objective, and tested for a period of five years (Article 6). 
The Finance Law No 2009-1673 of 30 December 2009 introduced contractual income support for autonomy, on an 
experimental basis. Decree No 2010-1395 of 12 November 2010 on mediation and legal activities concerning family 
matters experimented with an obligation to see family mediators. Law No 2011-1862 of 13 December 2011 on the 
allocation of litigation and the simplification of legal procedures experimented compulsory family mediation in certain 
disputes concerning children.
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Without waiting for the end of this first experiment, the Parliament adopted a sub-
stantial measure affecting its design in the summer of 2007, by moving to a second 
stage of legislation. Articles 18-23 of the Law of 21 August 2007 called “TEPA” 
(the law in favour of work, employment and real disposable income) opened up the 
experimentation of an “Active Solidarity Income” (Revenu de solidarité active – RSA) 
to all volunteering Departments. Section 22 of the Law requires the government to file 
an evaluation report before any generalisation of the RSA. The rapporteur of the Bill 
generalising the RSA lauded the approach taken by this assessment: 
“An evaluation committee was set up under the chairmanship of M. François 
Bourguignon, established from the beginning of the experimentation, and not a 
posteriori as is too often the case, and an evaluation protocol was drafted, based on 
comparisons with control areas with experimental areas”.14
The model of randomised experimentation is thus covered by the constitutional 
framework authorising local derogations to rules, for simple methods of evaluation. Its 
influence has grown with the approach of “social experimentation”, which is presented in 
France as a major innovation that can resolve complex social issues otherwise endlessly 
debated inconclusively (COMMISSION FAMILLE, VULNÉRABILITÉ, PAUVRETÉ, 2005). But it is 
far from having replaced traditional administrative experiments. Only these can anticipate 
the effects of reforms in all their dimensions, without succumbing to the pressure for 
change. It is here that the two forms of assessment diverge. Administrative experimen-
tation is motivated by doubts over norms and standards: it seeks to anticipate the negative 
consequences of reform decisions. Random testing is guided by hopes concerning new 
norms and standards: in this case proposed reforms are assumed to have positive effects.
The Lessons for Experimental Social Sciences
Economics as a science is familiar with the idea of experimentation. In mainstream 
neo-classical economics, experimentation is one of the “empirical dimensions” of 
testing microeconomic models, by simulating agents’ real behaviour in a laboratory 
environment. This field has grown considerably since its beginnings in the immediate 
post-war period, leading finally to the award of the 2002 Nobel prize in economics 
to Vernon L. Smith “for having made laboratory experimentation an instrument of 
empirical economic analysis” (BIAIS, RULLIÈRE, 2003). However, while this form of 
experimentation does partly help with decision-making, particularly in terms of eco-
nomic policy, its primary goal is knowledge: its aim is to test the validity of economic 
theories, or to explain the observed regularities.
14. Daubresse M.-P. (rapporteur) (2008), « Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles, familiales et 
sociales sur le projet de loi (n° 1100) généralisant le revenu de solidarité active et réformant les politiques d’insertion ». 
Rapport, No 1113, Paris: Assemblée nationale, p. 35. Online http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rapports/r1113.
pdf (accessed 3 May 2016).
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Experimentation takes on another form when it is used not merely to provide “vali-
dated” theoretical models for policy-makers, but when it aims to test the effectiveness 
of a given policy instrument in achieving a specific result. The process then falls within 
the field of experimental science, and requires the use of a robust method to create test 
groups. Random assignment, theorised by Ronald FISCHER in 1935, is the best means 
for conducting this type of research. It has the merit of rendering the various samples 
thus constituted identical, as “randomisers” have systematically pointed out. Precision 
only depends on sample size:
“Random draws, of a test group and a control group within a same population, ensure 
the comparability of the two groups: on average, the population characteristics of 
each of these groups are not statistically different. The larger the sample, the more 
these characteristics are likely to be similar. This property applies to the observable 
characteristics (gender, age, academic achievement, educational level, etc.), but also 
those which are not: characteristics which are specific to individuals and difficult to 
measure, such as motivation, self-confidence, etc.”15
Strict adherence to random assignment is a safeguard against selection biases that 
disrupt the value and precision of estimates made from the data of an experiment. The 
areas studied by FISCHER concerned experimental science: the random assignment here 
is a matter of procedure, of method, as is the quality of the collection of experimental 
data. When an experiment is conducted according to the rules of the art, the difference 
in values for the criterion tested between the treated and untreated groups is indeed 
due to the specific effects of the criterion itself.
It is tempting to consider various social policies as “treatments” applied to popula-
tions whose behaviour policy-makers want to change. Compared to other methods for 
proving the effectiveness of reform, “randomisers” hold out the promise of greater 
scientific certainty regarding the effects of a measure on specific behaviours. However, 
once the experiments are conducted in the real world and not in the laboratory, the 
evidence is more difficult to establish. As we shall see, several examples of experiments 
conducted in France in recent years show that their proponents have not attached due 
attention to the consequences of their immersion in the real world concerning the 
robustness of the results. In the case of the RSA, it seems that initially assessors of the 
experiment were only observers who had no control over the conduct of operations at 
any time. In the experiment on the placement of unemployed persons, the assessors 
were not able to control random assignment in the operation. Finally, in the testing 
of the “Parents’ schoolbag” (la Mallette des parents) project, which aims to provide 
parents with better information about how their children’s schooling and education 
operate, it was not possible to isolate statistically the specific effect of the measure.
15. Ministère des Sports, de la Jeunesse, de l’Éducation populaire et de la Vie associative, Fonds d’expérimentation 
pour la jeunesse (2012), Rapport d’activité 2009-2011, p. 35. Online http://www.experimentation.jeunes.gouv.fr/IMG/
pdf/FEJ_RA_20092011_CorpsRapport.pdf (accessed 3 May 2016). The size of the sample depends on other factors 
such as the importance of the effect, see below.
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The Difficulties of Carrying Out Experiments
The results of the experiments concerning RSA income support conducted in 
33 Departments on incentives to return to work generated controversy in parliamentary 
discussions in the autumn 2008 (GOMEL, SERVERIN, 2009). These results were also 
discussed by some economists (CAHUC, ZYLBERBERG, 2009). Despite the very short 
duration of the experiment (five months), experimenters provided discussions with a 
very weighty “finding”, namely that the rate of return to employment had increased 
by 30%. A few months later, when results were available for a slightly longer period, 
the effect of the RSA turned out to be three times lower. Whatever the actual level, this 
percentage identified did not have the meaning which lawmakers attributed to it. But it 
only had a purely statistical sense, summed up by the Scientific Evaluation Committee: 
“The rate of entry into employment of recipients of the RMI in the experimental 
areas is on average higher than in the control areas, but the gap varies quite widely 
between Departments and over time.”
(COMITÉ D’ÉVALUATION DES EXPÉRIMENTATIONS, 2009, p. 12.)
Nevertheless, the difference between the experimental and control areas, which was 30% 
on average in the first five months, was no more than 9% after 15 months, at the usual 
5% threshold of significance (COMITÉ D’ÉVALUATION DES EXPÉRIMENTATIONS, 2009,  p. 13):
“[...] The average monthly rate of job entry in control areas is 3.1%. The difference 
between experimental and control areas zones is 0.28 percentage points, or an extra 
9% of job entry rates in areas experimenting the RSA. […] The probability of being 
wrong in asserting that the effect of the experimental RSA on the return to work is 
greater than zero is 12%. This is not a high value, but nevertheless leaves limited 
room for uncertainty.”
This was not the only weakness of the experiment. When the policy came into 
force, a massive phenomenon of non-take-up of its new component –the RSA-activité, 
aimed at the working poor– cast doubt on the relevance of a model geared only to 
financial incentives (SERVERIN, 2012).
Apart from discussion of the results, two methodological issues raise questions.
First, the assessors were not able to determine the method of fixing the test and 
control areas, which is particularly disturbing given the importance the experimenters 
give to random assignment. In fact the law gave local authorities the freedom to choose 
the concrete modalities of the experimentation. In particular, the Regional Councils 
selected the zones for experimentation. These were often the most disadvantaged 
socially, while Councils showed no concern for finding a control zone for comparisons. 
The team responsible for selecting the control areas was not able to match each zone 
tested with a control area. It was not therefore possible to compare the rate of return to 
employment for each Department conducting the RSA experiment with the effects of 
the RMI, which would have provided information about variations in the RSA experi-
ments. As the treated and control populations were comparable on a general level, the 
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only calculable outcomes about the return to work related to the average difference 
between the entire population treated and entire control population.
Second, qualitative research monitoring the experimentation has shown that 
information about the persons concerned in the areas experimenting the RSA was 
not better controlled for either. Yet it was precisely here the incentive effects are to 
be found, which the proponents of experimentation were looking for. A monographic 
study conducted during the experiment in five Departments (LONCLE et al., 2008) 
showed that communication with target audiences was “prudent”, not to say opaque, 
whereas persons concerned should have had access to complete information. The 
objectives themselves were not limited to the resumption of activity, but could have 
been broader (changing the action of administrators accompanying the policy, ensuring 
predictability of income, etc.). They would then have shown greater continuity with 
the reorganizations already occurring as part of the devolution processes of the RMI.16
In reality, the conditions of the experiment were only controlled at the margin. 
This should have prompted caution on behalf of the assessors, and at the very least, 
it should have led them to refuse to provide any results whatsoever concerning the 
“incentive” nature of the measure.
The Difficulties of Controlling Objectives Through Random Assignment
A large randomised experiment was conducted in 2007 by France’s national unem-
ployment insurance fund and the public network of jobcentres (respectively Unédic 
and ANPE) on enhanced individual support and accompaniment for jobseekers. This 
experiment testified to the changes concerning the role of random chance in experi-
ments, the reasons for such shifts and their consequences for results.
The evaluation of the effectiveness of two procedures for the enhanced accompa-
niment of jobseekers was a first in France, in terms of the exceptional means mobilised 
(the evaluation covered altogether more than 200,000 jobseekers) and its methodo-
logical quality. On the basis of a random draw, three groups were created: 
“those who were offered POP (Private Operator Placement) accompaniment; persons 
offered ‘company destination’ or CVE accompaniment (Cap vers l’entreprise), and 
persons provided with the traditional enhanced accompaniment provided by French 
jobcentres”.
(ANPE, DARES, Unédic, 2008, p. 4)
The authors stressed that the random draw ensured the comparability of the three 
groups (p. 4):
16. Another survey conducted by the Crédoc (Research Centre on the Study and Monitoring of Living Conditions) 
of beneficiaries in the same five Departments shows that claimants are very unlikely to position themselves in the 
simple dichotomy between work or income support given in the models. The concern here is one of regularity and 
certainty in receiving regular benefits as a complement to wages. The need for security and regularity is shared by all 
households regardless of income levels.
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“The same proportion of young people, women, etc. (this can be checked) but also 
the same proportion of motivated, dynamic jobseekers, etc. (even if we cannot check 
this, as it is not really possible to measure motivation or energy, it is sure to be so 
if the groups are large enough and are drawn randomly). Therefore, if we observe 
differences in jobseekers return to work between these three groups, we know that 
these differences are due to the fact that these persons were not offered the same type 
of support, and that only.”
Despite this presentation, everyone remembers that the experiment pointed to the 
superiority of the public operator (the CVE programme) over the private operators, 
while the experiment occurred at a time when the ANPE and the Unédic were com-
peting with private operators to obtain the market for jobseeker placement.17 Several 
factors explain this misunderstanding, though a direct comparison between the CVE 
and the POP was not on the agenda of the experiment.18 It seems there were even hesita-
tions concerning the objectives of the study within the final report itself (BEHAGHEL 
et al., 2009).
On the one hand, the report recalls the initial objective (p. IV): 
“This protocol, of ‘controlled experimentation’, guarantees that the different situ-
ations in the labour market that can be observed between the groups after several 
months can only result from the benefits of the programmes. Thus the value-added 
of CVE and POP programmes is measured with precision and certainty”.
Rates for exiting unemployment at three, six and twelve months of compensated flows 
without enhanced accompaniment are given: 12% at three months, 23% at six months, 
and 37% at twelve months. “After 12 months, CVE support raises the exit rate from 
unemployment from 37% to 44%” and “the effects of POP […] are generally weaker 
and later” (p. V).
On the other hand, the report emphasizes the importance of direct comparison 
between the two operators. For this, observation was restricted to common geographic 
areas to ensure that the “economic conditions and target populations were then iden-
tical” (p. V). 
“In these areas, the effects of both programmes are stronger, but also more mixed: 
CVE increased the exit rates by 11 points from the third month, while over this 
horizon the effect of POP was still not significant. At 12 months, CVE had an impact 
of 8.5 points and POPs had an impact of 6.4 points” (p. V).
From one part of the report to another, the objective of the assessment changed, 
from examining the behaviour of jobseekers to looking at the operators. This shift was 
17. Before the merger of the ANPE-Assedic (the payment centres of the Unédic unemployment insurance fund) 
disrupted the distribution of functions that was being put into place.
18. It is only really possible to compare POP support with standard jobseeker support on the one hand, and CVE 
support with standard jobseeker support on the other hand. By contrast, it is not possible to compare directly the results 
of POP support and CVE support, if the strengths and securities stemming from random selection were to be retained. 
This comparison could only be carried out indirectly: so in fact, two parallel comparisons were conducted to compare 
the respective performances of CVE and POP support relative to standard jobseeker support.
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due to the conditions in which the experiment was conducted, and more specifically 
due to the direct intervention of project operators in the final assignment of jobseekers 
to the groups tested. Indeed, according to the study, only 47% of jobseekers randomly 
assigned to a POP were actually supported by the POP, with the support rate of CVE 
projects being 43%. At the same time, only a small proportion of non-entrants into 
projects –less than 20%– reflected the refusal of jobseekers themselves from partici-
pating in a project. In most cases, jobseekers were rejected from participating after 
selection was directly organized by operators, on a case-by-case basis. The latter tried 
to keep only those jobseekers most likely, in their view, to benefit from the enhanced 
accompaniment. The greater selectivity of the CVE scheme could be explained by 
a better knowledge of jobseekers and so explain the greater success of enhanced 
accompaniment. This issue is discussed at the very end of the summary of the final 
evaluation report. It is pointed out as a new item to be addressed in future analyses. 
But it actually revives questions about the ability of random assignment, which was the 
main innovation of the method, to help identify the direct effects of the programmes 
in explaining differences in the exit rates from unemployment into getting a job. As 
the authors of the report themselves finally state,
“it is plausible that differences in outcomes [of the POPs] compared to the CVE pro-
grammes may be interpreted by the incentives given to the different actors involved” 
(p. VIII).
Despite the very significant adjustments to the random assignment in the imple-
mentation of the experiment, the final report continued to focus, in its presentation of 
the experimental protocol, on the importance of (pp. 2-3):
“The value-added of a programme is defined as the difference in the situation of 
individuals benefiting from the programme compared to what would have been 
their situation if they had not benefited from it […]. To re-create this hypothetical 
situation (i.e. the counter-factual), assessment generally refers to a control group. 
[…] Constructing an appropriate control group is difficult. […] It is nevertheless 
possible to ensure, in the construction, that we can obtain a group of beneficiaries and 
a control group which are thoroughly comparable. This can be done using random 
selection from the same population. The differences in paths observed following the 
programme’s implementation can then be attributed transparently and robustly to 
the programme, and to it alone. This was the principle of the experimental protocol 
applied to the evaluation of the POP and CVE programmes…”
The final presentation, once the experiment was conducted, used exactly the 
same words to publicise the assessment (ANPE, DARES, Unédic, 2008), despite the 
“uncertainties” faced during the implementation.
The assessors neglected the impact the selection of operators had on the scope of 
the enhanced accompaniment, and were only concerned about the voluntary partici-
pation (compliance) of jobseekers: 
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“The assessment only provides information on the average impact of enhanced 
support when participation is voluntary, and only if 50% of persons to whom the 
programme was offered actually participated: the average effect on all jobseekers 
would potentially be different if participation were compulsory and if 100% of job-
seekers thus participated” (p. 14).
What is ultimately calculated is the average impact of support on persons accompanied 
(PARIENTÉ, 2008). The conditions of the effective entry into the support programmes of 
the experiment were taken as given.19 Yet these conditions modified the very essence 
of the “support effect”.
Isolating the Specific Effect of the Variable Being Studied
The “Parents’ schoolbag” project implemented in 2008-2009, within the Youth 
Experimentation Fund (Fonds d’expérimentation pour la jeunesse – FEJ), held out 
the same prospects of improving problematic social situations (AVVISATI et al., 2011). 
It was evaluated by a team from the Paris School of Economics. Funding for this 
experiment was justified by the fact that the involvement of parents in middle school 
and its effects on pupils’ behaviour is a crucial question which has long been debated. 
And “yet nothing was ever really tried to shed light on the question rigorously” (p. 5). 
For the first time in France, an experimental trial in this area would aid in “judging the 
effectiveness of a policy” and “the appropriateness of generalising” the policy (p. 5). 
This would be achieved thanks to an experimental protocol aiming at “a rigorous and 
transparent assessment” (p. 5) of the programme. According to the investigators, “as 
a random draw ensures that there is no systematic difference […], the differences that 
can be observed […] can be definitely attributed to a single cause: the benefit of the 
programme” (p. 5).
The trial took place in 40 middle schools belonging to the regional education 
Academy of Créteil (to the south-east of central Paris) (pp. 3-4).
“Earlier this year, about a hundred classes were randomly selected. Their parents were 
then invited by the principal to attend a series of briefings on the functioning of the 
middle school and to discuss how best to help children and to interact with teachers. 
At the end of the school year, when comparing these parents to other classes in the 
first year of middle school (initially similar but not randomly selected), they were 
characterised by being significantly more involved in their children’s schooling. […] 
In particular, the data show that this increased involvement resulted in a significant 
improvement of children’s behaviour.”
19. The acceptance of jobseekers randomly assigned to reinforced accompaniment under CVE or POP is only a 
problem of the generalisation of the experiment’s results. By contrast, the further selection by the operators raises 
another problem: the observed effects will mix two causes: i) the quality of their enhanced support, and ii) the ability 
of operators to choose candidates who are best able to take advantage of the strengthening of services to help with 
access to employment among applicants and randomly assigned volunteers. To achieve this second selection, the CVE 
programmes certainly had better expertise in using the ANPE data made available to all operators.
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This improvement was measured using a series of indicators of student behaviour 
relating to absenteeism, sanctions, “distinctions” and to school life scores.
“Whether it is absenteeism or a composite ‘quality of behaviour’ score summarising 
three other variables, the test groups’ advantage over the control groups is about 10% 
of a standard deviation. Given their magnitude, these differences are clearly greater 
than chance effects in the investigation” (p. 15).
Moreover, the experiments have shown that “the virtuous effect of these openness 
policies towards parents extends beyond the usual circle of those families who are most 
attentive to the tuition of their children, and affects families and pupils who are most 
detached from the school system (by ripple effects in classrooms)” (p. 3).
But how is this improvement to be explained? For the experimenters, there was no 
doubt that this was indeed a result of the parental involvement programme. However, 
it is far from certain that the participating population was actually more involved in 
middle-school life. The results of the experiment show an equivalent rate of non-
responses by the parents of test groups and control groups in the final assessment, 
whereas one would have expected greater participation of the former. This is a 
weakness in the methodology which was recognised by the experimenters, but which 
they suggested is limited in scope: 
“If the response rates were very different […], then comparing the responses obtained 
in test classes and control classes could no longer be interpreted as reflecting the sole 
effect of eligibility for the experimental programme” (p. 10). 
But even if non-significant, the fact that the rate of parent responses in test classes is 
still slightly lower than for the control classes is troublesome, for an experiment that 
specifically addresses parental involvement and its effect on children’s behaviour.
As we can see, it is not so easy in a “natural” experimental framework to ensure 
the validity of results, from an internal point of view (in terms of the variables used). 
This is even truer from an external point of view, because of the impossibility of being 
certain that other causal variables do not intervene. Yet it is the external validity that 
has to do with generalisability: “are these results valid also for the broader population 
for which the policy or treatment is being considered?” (RODRIK, 2008, p. 16).
The scrapping of an experiment is not easy even if Article LO 1113-6 of Local 
Government Code provides for this. The assessors of another experimental programme 
of the Academy of Créteil to tackle truancy did indeed manifest such reticence. This 
programme made the headlines and received a negative review in April 2010, at the 
end of its pilot scheme, immediately followed by justifications (BEHAGHEL, GURGAND, 
2010, p. 16). This review “does not mean the measures had no effects –only an impact 
assessment could demonstrate this– but that the conditions of assessment were not 
met”. Accordingly, the conditions of the scheme’s social acceptance mentioned in the 
review in fact constituted two additional limits relating to the legitimacy of an experi-
mentation in social matters: first, issues to be evaluated should be consensual (though 
randomised experimentation is presented in canonical way as determining issues that 
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divide public opinion when there is a lack of evidence); and second, projects must be 
defined without prior knowledge that they will be funded as part of an evaluation. This 
seems to contradict the whole principle for responding to the call for projects by the 
Youth Experimentation Fund. The assessors added another type of condition (p. 2):
“from a scientific point of view, it is clear that the conditions for an objective 
assessment –that actors do not change their behaviour in view of assessment– were 
not met during the pilot project. There is no reason to think that these conditions 
were met in 2010-2011”. 
Knowing when and how to give up a project is indeed a challenge facing social experi-
menters who are officially involved in reforms.
The Contributions to Reform
One of the remarkable features of randomised social experiments is their vocation 
to be generalised. A guide on the methodology of the evaluation of social experi-
ments (Le Guide méthodologique pour l’évaluation des expérimentations sociales)20, 
published for project leaders in 2009, in fact set this as the primary purpose of projects 
(p. 2):
“This is a social policy innovation which is being initially launched on a small 
scale, given uncertainties about its effects and implementation under conditions that 
allow evaluation of the results, with a view to future generalisation, if the results are 
convincing”.
In its first evaluation report, the Scientific Council of the experimentation fund argued 
that the assessment of its action “would be judged in particular by its ability to inspire 
public decisions” (MINISTÈRE DE L’ÉDUCATION NATIONALE, DE LA JEUNESSE ET DE LA 
VIE ASSOCIATIVE, 2011, p. 6).
If we take the promises of social experimenters seriously, then we should soon see 
reforms emerge that are entirely constructed on the basis of experimental results. It is 
precisely this criterion of operationality that has dominated financial investment in such 
experiments for the last five years. It seems that today there is a growing awareness 
concerning the realism of these goals, and that there is a return to a more traditional 
approach to evaluation.
Random Experiments in Support of Decision-Making
Soon after having been promoted by the Hirsch Commission, random experi-
ments found their place in the budgets of central government, in the form of two 
20. Guide méthodologique pour l’évaluation des expérimentations sociales à l’intention des porteurs de projets. Online 
http://www.experimentation.jeunes.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/guide-pour-l-evaluation-des-experimentations.pdf (accessed 
3 May 2016).
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dedicated funds: the Innovation and Social Experimentation Fund (Fonds d’innovation 
et d’expérimentation sociale – FIES), established in 2006; and the fund supporting 
experimentation for young people, better known under the name of the Youth 
Experimentation Fund (Fonds d’expérimentation pour la jeunesse – FEJ), created in 
2008.
Since the 2006 Finance Law, the FIES has provided support for the development 
of experiments in anticipation and in support of public policies favouring solidarity and 
social cohesion. Experimentation is included in the Mission: “Solidarity, integration 
and equal opportunities”, in the Programme 304 of “Fighting poverty: active solidarity 
income and social experiments”, under Action No 2 called “Social experiments and 
other experiments in social and social economy matters”.21 This action is presented 
as an embodiment of 
“Resolution No 13 of the Families, vulnerability, poverty report of 2005, which aimed 
to make ‘boldness, innovation and experimentation’ keywords in public actions, 
based on the fact that action required for vulnerable families had to be customised 
and innovative” (p. 31).
Scientific backing is widely put to use: “selected by a panel including qualified per-
sonalities, experiments supported by the innovation fund and social experimentation 
are to be encouraged through calls for structured projects on topics listed above”.22
As for the fund supporting experimentation for young people,23 it places experi-
ments in the longer time horizon of research:
“The fund supporting experimentation for young people, established under Article 25 
of the Law of 1 December 2008 referred to above, aims to fund experimental pro-
grammes geared to promoting pupils’ success in schools, to contributing to equal 
opportunities and to improving the sustainable social and professional integration 
of young people under 25 years old. The fund may therefore finance spin-off experi-
ments in new territories […].”24
To its promoters, the fund’s objective is not to finance projects only for their own 
sake, but “to learn, in order to capitalise mobilised knowledge for the design of future 
public policies” (MINISTÈRE DE L’ÉDUCATION NATIONALE, DE LA JEUNESSE ET DE LA VIE 
ASSOCIATIVE, 2011, p. 7). Budgets and actions have followed. Since its creation, the 
21. The Interministerial Mission on Annual Projects for Performance (2012) (« Programme 304. Lutte contre la 
pauvreté : revenu de solidarité active et expérimentations sociales », In Mission interministérielle. Projets annuels de 
performance. Annexe au projet de loi de finances pour 2012. Solidarité, insertion et égalité des chances, pp. 19-43.) 
Online http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/sites/performance_publique/files/farandole/ressources/2012/
pap/pdf/PAP2012_BG_Solidarite_insertion_egalite_des_chances.pdf (accessed 3 May 2016).
22. A document for cross-cutting policies. The 2011 Finance Bill (2011) (Document de politique transversale. Projet 
de loi de finances pour 2011. Inclusion sociale, p. 17.) Online http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/
sites/performance_publique/files/farandole/ressources/2011/pap/pdf/dpt/DPT2011_inclusion_sociale.pdf (accessed 
3 May 2016).
23. Created by Article 25 of the Law of 1 Deccember 2008, modified by the Law No 2010-1658 of the 29 December 
2010, Article 21.
24. Decree No 2011-1603 of 21 November 2011.
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Youth Experimentation Fund has launched 11 calls for projects, received over 1,500 
experimental project proposals, and has brought together over 30 expert panels. More 
than 380 experiments (lasting an average of three years) have been selected throughout 
the country (mainland France and overseas territories) addressing extremely varied 
themes.25
While the activities of the FIES have not been accompanied by dedicated indi-
cators, the actions of the EFJ have had two. These were set out in the 2012 Finance 
Bill, in Programme 163 for “Youth and associative life” of the annual performance 
project of the “Sport, youth and community life” Mission. The former measures the 
share of projects which actually began six months after their selection. The latter 
indicator identifies “controlled experiments” within all experiments. This indicator 
is accompanied by a commentary which restates the principles and precepts of the 
methodological guide (p. 107):
“[The indicator is] intended to support the development, via the EFJ, of a so-called 
‘controlled’ experimental approach, based on the observation of a test group 
 benefitting from a particular policy/measure and a control group that does not benefit 
from it. These groups are constructed by selecting people using random draws. This 
approach is based on quantitative assessment, and has been practiced especially 
in Anglo-Saxon countries for decades. It still remains to be developed widely in 
France, especially in the field of public policy. Based on representative samples 
(from hundreds of individuals to thousands, or more), the approach provides strong 
demonstrative scope to the policies/measures assessed.”
The emphasis given to methodology reached its high point here, virtually holding 
out the possibilities of an official science in the service of political action. This is 
clearly going a bit too far. A significant change of tone can be seen in the PAPs (Projets 
annuels de performance) of the 2013 Finance Bill, which leans towards an approach 
that is not so tied to scientific procedure.
Experiments in Support of Analysis
The change in presentation is particularly sensitive for the experiments included 
in the Programme 304 of “Fighting poverty: active solidarity income and social experi-
ments”. From 2013 onwards, Action 12 for a “social and solidarity-based economy” 
of the programme has been dedicated exclusively to actions relating to the support 
and development of a social and solidarity-based economy. The actions relating to 
other experiments in social matters are included in Action 13 for “Other experimenta-
tions”, which has changed significantly in volume. The actions of Programme 304 
are thus loosing experimental funding: of the €5,981,487 attributed to the former 
action for “Social experimentation and other experiences in social areas and social 
economy” in 2012, €5 million has now been transferred to Action 12 for a “Social and 
25. Projects available online http://www.experimentation.jeunes.gouv.fr/.
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solidarity-based economy”. The remaining €981,947 is now only linked to experiments 
in a limited way:
“The 2013 budget of €981,487, for which committed authorisations = payment 
appropriations,26 will support the development of experiments in anticipation and in 
support of public policies in favour of solidarity and social cohesion.
The funds of Action 13 will allow support to be obtained for the operation of the 
New Agency for Active Solidarity (Agence nouvelle des solidarités actives – ANSA). 
This is part of a multi-year convention currently operating, with the objective of 
contributing to the development of experiments, the pooling of good practices across 
geographical areas (particularly in terms of access to minimum benefits by claimants) 
and testing and evaluating of innovative projects in the field to tackle poverty, projects 
which are focused on preventing the breakdown of social bonds.
They must also enable the development of social engineering approaches, as part 
of experimental programmes to test the relevance, effectiveness, coherence and 
efficiency of public policies supporting social innovation on a limited scale (in four 
of France’s regions). The programme will aim to strengthen the tracking and support 
capacities of decentralised networks of social cohesion with respect to initiatives 
aimed at strengthening social bonds in geographical areas, and to create momentum 
in the field of social innovation.”27
The aim of supporting local projects henceforth could not be stated more clearly, 
and this has more to do with administrative experimentation than science-based 
experimentation.
In the PAP of the Sport, Youth and Associations Mission for 2013, the tone also 
changed concerning the presentation of the objectives of experimentation.28 To be sure, 
the goal was “to support and evaluate, in a specified manner, innovative measures that 
contribute to youth empowerment, in the context of implementing new public policies 
for young people” (p. 89). But the methodology is only mentioned in passing, recalling 
that “the external and scientific evaluation of these projects, if possible controlled, is an 
integral part of the selection conditions of funded projects” (p. 89). The focus is on the 
dissemination of the work, as a way of pushing experimenters to take on the function of 
disseminating information. A new indicator (indicator 4.1) is produced, whose purpose 
is to measure the dissemination of the results of supported experiments: 
26. Commitment authorisations (Autorisations d’engagement – AE) are the upper limit of expenditure which may be 
incurred. Payment appropriations (Crédits de paiement – CP) are the upper limit of expenditure which can be scheduled 
or paid during the year to cover commitments entered into within the framework of commitment authorisations.
27. The Interministerial Mission on Annual Projects for Performance (2013) (Mission interministérielle. Projets 
annuels de performance. Annexe au projet de loi de finances pour 2013. Solidarité, insertion et égalité des chances, 
p. 35.) Online http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/sites/performance_publique/files/farandole/res-
sources/2013/pap/pdf/PAP2013_BG_Solidarite_insertion_egalite_des_chances.pdf (accessed 3 May 2016).
28. The Interministerial Mission on Annual Projects for Performance (2012) (« Programme 163. Jeunesse et vie 
associative », In Mission interministérielle. Projets annuels de performance. Annexe au projet de loi de finances pour 
2012. Sport, jeunesse et vie associative, pp. 81-115.) Online http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/sites/
performance_publique/files/farandole/ressources/2012/pap/pdf/PAP2012_BG_Sport_jeunesse_vie_associative.pdf 
(accessed 3 May 2016).
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“to provide useful food for thought for policy-makers as part of the development of 
youth policies, the results of experiments supported under the FEJ must be available 
and accessible. Their posting on the government website (www.jeunes.gouv.fr) is 
therefore important” (p. 89).
The indicator includes two measures:
“The share of the experiments which were the subject of a processed and published 
evaluation report / The total number of funded experiments; The share of the final 
evaluation reports that are processed and published in the year / total number of 
reports expected in the year” (p. 89). 
In the new terminology, the aim is now to provide “food for thought”, and not to gen-
erate strong demonstrative reach. In this context, simple random experiments become 
a mere reservoir of ideas, and are no longer oriented towards specific reform projects.
Finally, new experiments are emerging which are more administrative in their 
approach to testing standards. The Solidarity, Inclusion and Equal Opportunities 
Mission includes Programme 137 for “Equality between women and men”. In 2013, 
Action No 14 was introduced to “support actions for experimenting measures in favour 
of equality between women and men” (p. 126).29 With a budget of €6.3 million, this 
action involved the creation of a budgetary fund, on 1 January 2013, for “experimen-
tation in favour of women’s rights and equality between women and men”. Its objective 
is to “implement support programmes and experiments and lay the foundations of 
new practices promoting professional equality and the effective protection of women 
against violence” (p. 111 and 126).
These experiments are defined by their objectives, without specifying any 
method.30 There is no longer any question of using randomisation, only support for 
testing measures in the true administrative tradition.
This change could augur a redistribution of responsibilities in their respective 
fields: decision-makers decide, social scientists conduct scientific experiments, which 
they must validate according to the rules of the art. However, researchers involved in 
29. The Interministerial Mission on Annual Projects for Performance (2013) (« Programme 137. Égalité entre les 
femmes et les hommes », In Mission interministérielle. Projets annuels de performance. Annexe au projet de loi de 
finances pour 2013. Solidarité, insertion et égalité des chances, pp. 107-130.) Online http://www.performance-pub-
lique.budget.gouv.fr/sites/performance_publique/files/farandole/ressources/2013/pap/pdf/PAP2013_BG_Solidarite_
insertion_egalite_des_chances.pdf (accessed 3 May 2016).
30. They will relate to “the development of agreements in companies and the improvement of their quality; to orien-
tation and gender diversity to expand the share of girls following a scientific and technical education and their share 
in the corresponding professions, but also to promote female-dominated occupations among boys; on the training of 
the beneficiaries to complement their free choice to work during parental leave, in order to reduce the effects of being 
away from work” (p. 110).
In addition, “other experiments may be implemented in the field of workplace equality or in the fight against violence, 
particularly with regard to extending measures such as the programme providing women in danger with mobile 
telephones (Téléphone grande danger).
An experimental programme will be based on the principles of partnership and support/accompaniment (with social 
partners, associations and communities). The experimental programmes will be most often selected through calls-
for-project procedures” (p. 127).
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experimenting reforms are still subject to the risk of their findings being instrumen-
talised: for example, as with the researchers involved in an experiment on the use of 
anonymous Curriculum Vitae (CVs), prior to the publication of a government decree 
(BEHAGHEL et al., 2011).31 By invoking the results of the study, the Commissioner for 
Diversity and Equal Opportunities, Yazid Sabeg, renounced publishing the decree that 
would have made anonymity mandatory for candidates applying to the companies 
concerned. However, the authors of the study had not given a conclusion “on the full 
effects of generalising anonymous CVs”, while they specified that the study did not 
allow “for the existence of discrimination in hiring to be tested” as they had stated 
a few months earlier, in a long letter to the press.32 Researchers therefore clearly 
face difficulties in controlling the interpretations of their results by their sponsors. 
But such differences in interpretation are hardly surprising: in fact they bear out the 
autonomy of political justification relative to scientific justification, and should lead 
researchers to look elsewhere to obtain the validation or their work, rather than in 
political decision-making.
Finding a Place for Random Social Experimentation
The major criticism that can be made concerning social experiments, in the French 
tradition, is that they have blurred the line between research and policy making (GOMEL, 
SERVERIN, 2009). To restore the distinction, two dimensions should be considered: i) the 
ethical concerns in the conduct of research, and ii) the necessary control of experiments 
by scientific communities, to ensure independent research.
The Necessary Consideration of Ethics
Various kinds of ethical control may be exercised in experimental social research. 
Apart from the ethical commitments of researchers themselves with regard to their 
sponsors (public or private), these involve especially authorisation and control mecha-
nisms that govern research on human beings, in particular in the area of biomedical 
research. Can these rules be applied to social experiments? There is no simple answer 
to this. Rules are set out in legal codes relating to the ethics of experimental research 
focusing on human life (the human body and health), but not on human behaviour. A 
priori, the definition of biomedical research in Article L. 1121-1 of the Public Health 
Code (in the version derived from the Ordinance of 23 February 2010) does not seem 
31. Article L. 1221-7 of the Labour Code (modified by a Law of 22 March 2012) states that in “companies with at 
least 50 employees, the information mentioned in Article L. 1221-6 and communicated in writing by jobseekers can 
only be examined by preserving the candidate’s anonymity”, and adds that “the modalities for applying the present 
article have been determined by decree by the Council of State”.
32. Behaghel L., Crépon B., and Le Barbanchon T. (2011), « CV anonyme : ce que dit l’évaluation », Libération, 
27 April 2011.
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suited to this type of research: “The research conducted and practiced on humans for 
the development of biological and medical knowledge is authorised under the condi-
tions provided for in this book and is designated below as being ‘biomedical research’”. 
However, Article L. 1121-3, paragraph 4 of the Code also clearly provides an (indirect) 
reference to experiment on behaviour: “in the sciences of human behaviour, a qualified 
person, together with the investigator, may direct research”.33
This simple statement has found a normative extension in Law No 2012-300 of 
5 March 2012 on research involving human beings, following the Bill submitted to 
Parliament by Olivier Jardé (Member of Parliament), in 2009. Its author wanted to 
give a status to non-interventional studies (such as monitoring cohorts), to allow them 
to be reviewed by ethics committees. The law introduced in Article L. 1121-1 of the 
Public Health Code distinguishes between interventional research (which involves 
intervention on humans) and non-interventional research, “in which all acts are per-
formed and products used in the usual way, without additional or unusual procedures 
for diagnosis, treatment or monitoring”.34
This text puts experimental research under the supervision of committees pro-
tecting persons. No experimentation on people’s behaviour, claiming to be “scientific” 
will henceforth be able to escape presentation before ethical bodies. This therefore only 
excludes administrative-type experiments, relating to the organization of government 
bodies, including assessments which do not seek to be scientific but which are technical 
and administrative, and which are similar to impact studies (GOMEL, SERVERIN, 2011).
The law thus also supports ethics, as has now been identified for several years by 
the CNRS Ethics Committee (Comité d'éthique du CNRS – Comets). In a first opinion 
published in 2007, the committee recommended particular caution concerning experi-
ments on behaviour which may involve psychological risks when applied to vulnerable 
persons, such as “persons in social difficulty, immigrants, prisoners, drug addicts”.35 
In 2010, a second opinion focused on the ethics of research in social experimentation, 
and also recommended the submission of projects to ethical principles, and their pub-
lication in journals specialised in the experimental sciences.36
33. This specification was introduced by Law No 94-630 of 25 July 1994, and was upheld by the Law of 7 July 2011 
in paragraph 4 of the same article.
34. Article L. 1121-3 includes a 7th paragraph stipulating that “non-interventional research may be carried out under 
the direction and supervision by a qualified person. The Committee for the Protection of Persons will ensure the 
appropriate qualifications of investigators and the characteristics of research”.
35. COMETS, Réflexions sur éthique et sciences du comportement humain, 23 February 2007, p. 23 and: “A risk to 
mental integrity exists whenever an individual is subjected to conditions that may permanently alter their emotional 
equilibrium […]. Risks involved include […] exposure to emotional or aversive stimuli, using lures or distortions 
of reality (virtual reality), situations leading to the systematic failure of individuals, and putting individuals into 
competition or conflict with others”. Online http://www.cnrs.fr/comets/IMG/pdf/14-comportement_070226-2.pdf 
(accessed 3 May 2016).
36. COMETS, Éthique de la recherche dans l’expérimentation sociale, 19 January 2010. Online http://www.cnrs.fr/
comets/IMG/pdf/07-experimentation-sociale-20100119-2.pdf (accessed 3 May 2016).
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The Requirement for Monitoring Results by Peers
Independent research is not synonymous with research without control. Assessment 
and evaluation have always been included in the core institutional arrangements for 
public research, through two complementary processes: the control of expenditure, 
and control of relevance. The first is normally a responsibility of the public authority 
that allocates funds to research organizations; the second is provided by what is com-
monly called the “scientific community”. These principles of assessment are found 
in a specific chapter of France’s Research Code: the “Evaluation and monitoring of 
research and technological development”. Article L.114-1 in particular states that
“research activities funded in whole or in part by public monies, undertaken by 
public or private operators, are assessed on the basis of objective criteria tailored to 
each of them and based on the best international practices. Among these criteria, the 
contributions to the development of scientific culture […] are taken into account”. 
These assessments are carried out in full transparency, as provided by Article L. 
114-1-1:
“The procedures and results of the evaluation of a research activity funded in whole or 
in part by public funds provided for in Article L.114-1 are made public under condi-
tions ensuring respect for secrets protected by law and the confidentiality clauses in 
contracts with third parties […]”.
While social experiments do clearly fall within the domain of scientific research, 
as claimed by their promoters, and if they are necessarily publicly funded, then they 
should follow two paths of scientific assessment: i) assessment by peers, through publi-
cations in scientific journals with referee committees; and ii) the budgetary assessment 
of the funds they use, whose proportion should be measured relative to other public 
research funding. The first type of assessment clearly requires defining the disciplinary 
scope of studies (experimental psychology, social psychology, economics, statistics, 
etc.), in order to identify their contribution to knowledge. As for budgetary assessment, 
it seems, as seen above, that the purpose of the expenditure should shift from pure 
social engineering towards creating knowledge. This is a welcome development. The 
expenditure on random testing could then return to its natural place in public spending, 
that is to say as part of the “research and higher education” mission of government.
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